Evolution in banking competition by Walter A. Varvel & Henry C. Wallich
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Walter  A.  Varvel  and  Henry  C.  Wallich* 
The  Supreme  Court  view  of  commercial  banking 
as  a  “distinct  line  of  commerce”  no  longer  reflects 
market  realities  in  many  sections  of  the  United 
States.  The  argument  used  by  the  Court  to  support 
its  findings  were  not  universally  endorsed  at  the  time. 
Today-they  have  been  sufficiently  eroded  by  changing 
competitive  conditions  and  financial  innovations  in 
the  markets  for  financial  services  to  require  a  re- 
assessment  of  the  competitive  position  of  commercial 
banks. 
The  “line  of  commerce”  view  remains  an  integral 
part  of  the  competitive  analysis  conducted  by  federal 
banking  agencies  in  connection  with  proposed  bank 
mergers  and  acquisitions.  Supreme  Court  determi- 
nations  of  the  appropriate  definitions  of  the  product 
line  and  geographic  markets  in  banking  directly  in- 
fluence  the  market  structure  variables  that  are  used 
by  regulators  as  indicators  of  market  competition. 
Experience  over  the  last  two  decades  has  led  regu- 
lators  to  the  general  view  that,  for  competitive  anal- 
ysis  purposes,  banks  can  be  considered  to  compete 
only  with  other  banks. 
Commercial  banking  has  been  treated  as  a  separate 
line  of  commerce  because  it  was  thought  to  offer  a 
unique  package  or  “cluster”  of  independent  deposi- 
tory  and  credit  services  to  bank  customers.  This 
treatment  has  the  effect  of  excluding  from  definitions 
of  product  markets  firms  that  compete  with  banks  in 
some  but  not  all  service  lines.  For  example,  in  their 
role  as  financial  intermediaries,  banks  face  competi- 
tion  for  funds  from  other  depository  institutions  as 
well  as  from  a  myriad  of  liability  instruments  offered 
in  the  money  market.  Moreover,  on  the  asset  side 
of  the  balance  sheet,  bank  credit  is  offered  in  compe- 
tition  with  thrift  institutions,  nonbank  firms  such  as 
finance  and  insurance  companies,  and  retailers,  as 
well  as  the  markets  for  securities  and  commercial 
paper.  Exclusion  of  this  competition  may  at  times 
result  in  overstatements  of  anticipated  anticompeti- 
tive  results  from  bank  consolidations, 
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Innovations  in  the  financial  sector  are  undermining 
the  line  of  commerce  view  by  eliminating  unique 
banking  services  and  reducing  interdependence 
among  banking  products.  Developments  encouraging 
the  separate  pricing  and  marketing  of  banking  ser- 
vices  are  further  increasing  the  effective  competition 
between  banks  and  other  providers  of  financial  ser- 
vices.  Recent  legislation  extends  interest-bearing 
transaction  account  authority  nationwide  to  thrift 
institutions,  substantially  expands  the  scope  of  their 
activities,  and  provides  for  the  phase-out  of  deposit 
interest  rate  ceilings.  In  this  environment,  a  re- 
evaluation  of competitive  analysis  in  banking  is  neces- 
sary  to  ensure  that  it  reflects  the  realities  of  the 
marketplace. 
The  Supreme  Court  Position:  Product  and  Geo- 
graphic  Markets  The  Supreme  Court,  in  ruling 
that  commercial  banking  is  the  relevant  “line  of 
commerce”  in  bank  merger  cases,’  relied  upon  the 
following  arguments:  (1)  some  bank  products  and 
services  are  so  distinctive  that  they  are  essentially 
free  of  effective  competition  from  other  financial  in- 
stitutions;  (2)  other  bank  products  and  services 
enjoy  cost  advantages  that  insulate  them  from  com- 
petition  from  substitutes  offered  by  other  institutions; 
(3)  banking  facilities  enjoy  a  “settled  consumer 
preference”  that  gives  them  an  advantage  over  simi- 
lar  nonbank  services;  and  (4)  the  “cluster”  of  prod- 
ucts  and  services  termed  commercial  banking  has 
economic  significance  well  beyond  the  various  prod- 
ucts  and  services  involved. 
In  the  Philadelphia  National  Bank  case,  the  Court 
declared  that  banks  offer  a  cluster  of  products  (vari- 
ous  kinds  of  credit)  and  services  (such  as  checking 
accounts  and  trust  services)  that  are  “so  distinctive 
that  they  are  entirely  free  of  effective  competition 
from  products  or  services  of  other  financial  institu- 
tions.”  In  the  Court  view,  banks  played  a  vital  and 
unique  role  in  the  national  economy  since  they  alone 
were  permitted  to  accept  demand  deposits.  This 
1 See  the  following  Supreme  Court  decisions:  United 
States  v.  Philadelphia  National  Bank,  374  U.S.  321 
(1963);  United  States  v.  Phillipsburg  National  Bank, 
399  U.S.  350  (1970);  and  United  States  v.  Connecticut 
National  Bank,  418  U.S.  656  (1974). 
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most  financial  transactions.  As  chief  repositories  for 
consumer  and  commercial  liquid  balance’s;  banks 
facilitate  the  efficient  transfer  of  funds  from  units 
with  surplus  funds  (creditors)  to  deficit  units  (bor- 
rowers).  Our  fractional  reserve  system,  ‘moreover, 
allows  banks  to  create  new  money  (deposits)  and 
credit  and  magnifies  banks’  importance  to  the 
economy. 
Control  of  the  checking  account  system  was  be- 
lieved  by  the  Court  to  invest  banks  with  such  advan- 
tages as  to  necessitate  customer  relations  with banks. 
Checking  account  powers  were  sufficiently  important 
to  distinguish  banks  from  the  institutions  that  most 
closely  resembled  them,  the  thrifts.  Later,  in  the 
Connecticut  case  where  thrifts  had  recently  received 
authority  to  offer  check-like  Negotiable  Order  of 
Withdrawal  (NOW)  accounts  to  individuals,  the 
Court  again  rejected  inclusion  of  savings  banks  in 
the  same  product  line  as  banks  since  Connecticut 
savings  banks  could  not  provide  comparable  commer- 
cial  services  to  business  customers. 
In  the  Philadelphia  case,  the  Court  found  that  in 
other  product  lines  (e.g.,  small  consumer  loans) 
banks  held  a  competitive  advantage  over  -financial 
institutions  that  offered  similar  products.  Banks,  the 
Court  argued,  relied  upon  lower  cost  funds  (i.e., 
demand  and  savings  deposits)  than  did  their  chief 
rivals  in  this  market  (consumer  finance  companies) 
who  purchased  funds  at  market  interest  rates,  in  sub- 
stantial  part,  from banks.  As  stated  by  the  Court,  the 
reason  for  this  competitive  disadvantage  is  that  “only 
banks  -obtain  the  bulk  of their  working  capital  without 
having-to  pay  interest  . _. . thereon,  by  virtue  of  their 
unique  power  to  accept  demand  deposits.  .  .  .” 
Cost  differentials  have  not  been  consistently  cited 
by  the  Court,  however,  to  distinguish  between  bank 
and  competitor  services.  Regulation  Q  authorizes 
thrift  institutions  to  pay  an  interest  premium  on 
savings  and  small  time  deposits  (presently  ¼  per- 
cent)  above  what  banks  can  offer  on  identical  instru- 
ments;  The  Court  did  not  believe  this  provided  a 
significant  competitive  advantage  to  thrifts,  however, 
in  the  rivalry  for  depositors’  funds.  On  the  con- 
trary,  bank  savings  retained  the  advantage  of  “settled 
consumer  preference”  due  to  coincident  checking 
account  relationships.  In  the  Court’s  words, “cus- 
tomers  are  likely  to  maintain  checking  and  savings 
accounts  in  the  same  local  bank  even  when  higher 
savings  interest  is  available  elsewhere.”  Since  thrifts 
were  not  authorized  to  offer  checking  accounts,  it 
was  reasoned,  consumers  were  willing  to  forego  some 
interest  for  the  convenience  of  one-stop  banking. 
Most  importantly,  perhaps,  the  Court  has  held  that 
it  is  the  cluster  of  products  and  services  that  full- 
service.  banks  offer  that  makes  banking  a  distinct 
line  of  commerce. 
Commercial  banks  are  the  only  financial  institu- 
tions  in  which  a  wide  variety  of  financial  products 
and  services-some  unique  to  commercial  -banking 
and  others  not-are  gathered  together  in  one  place. 
The  clustering  of  financial  products  and  services 
in  banks  facilitates  convenient  access  to  them  for 
all  banking  customers;  For  some  customers,  full- 
service  banking  makes  possible  access  to  certain 
products  or  services  that  would  otherwise  be  un- 
available  to  them.  .  .  . 
The  department  store  nature  of  banks,  in  other 
words,  represents  the  only  meaningful  alternative 
for  a  significant  class  of  customers-reducing  the 
effective  competition  provided  by  nonbank  firms. 
The  Court  recognizes  that  banks  do  face  direct  com- 
petition  in  some  individual  product  and  service  lines, 
or  submarkets  (savings,  personal  loans,  mortgage 
lending,  etc.).  Such  submarkets,  however,  “are  not  a 
basis  for  the  disregard  of  a  broader  line  of  commerce 
that  has  economic  significance.”2 
In  the  Court’s  view,  one-stop  banking  provides 
individual  bank  customers  with  unique  access  to  the 
wide  range  of  financial  services  a  bank  offers.  Main- 
taining  a  personal  checking  account,  for  example, 
provides  a  customer  with  access  to  a  wide  range of 
otherbank  services,  to  seek  free  financial  advice  from 
bank  management,  and  increases  the  chances  of  ob- 
taining  credit  when  needed.  These  services  would 
not  be  available  to  a  significant  number  of  customers 
outside  of  the  banking  relationship,  the  Court 
argued.  In  addition,  since  customer-bank  relation- 
ships  were  usually  established  because  of  locational 
convenience  (near  residence,  employment,  or  within 
shopping  patterns),  bank  customers  could  minimize 
the, time  and  resources  expended  (transactions  costs) 
searching  for  and  obtaining  financial  services.  In 
this  way,  the  Court  believed  banks  maintained  a 
competitive  advantage,  over  thrifts  and  nondepository 
institutions  and,  therefore,  the  aggregate  of  bank 
products  and:  services  should  be  treated  as  the  rele- 
vant  product  line  for  competitive  analysis  in  bank 
consolidation  proposals. 
The  uniqueness  of  some  commercial  bank  products 
and  services,  cost  advantages,  “consumer  preference,” 
one-stop  banking,  and  the  importance  of  locational 
2The  Court  declared  that  analysis  of  individual  sub- 
markets  are  appropriate,  however,  when.  considering  the 
effect  on  competition  of  a  merger  between  a  commercial 
bank  and  another  type  of  financial  institution.  United 
States  v.  Phillipsburg  National  Bank. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1981 convenience  have  been  the  dominant  considerations 
in  the  Court’s  position  on  the  appropriate  definition 
of  the  product  market  in  bank  merger  cases.  Loca- 
tional  convenience  has  also  played  a key  role  in  Court 
and  regulatory  definitions  of  the  geographic  markets 
in  competitive  analyses. 
The  Philadelphia  National  Bank  Case  In  United 
States  v.  Philadelphia  National  Bank,  the  Supreme 
Court  stated  that  the  area  of  effective  competition  in 
the  known  line  of commerce  must  be  selected  from the 
market  area  in  which  the  seller  operates  and  to  which 
the  buyer  can  practicably  turn  for  supplies.  In  bank- 
ing,  the  Court  observed  that  individuals  and  busi- 
nesses  typically  do  most  of  their  business  with  banks 
in  their  local  communities  since  they  find  it  imprac- 
tical  to  conduct  their  banking  business  at  a  distance. 
The  Court  recognized  that  individual  bank  cus- 
tomers,  however,  have  different  capabilities  in  shop- 
ping  for  banking  services-“the  relevant  geographical 
market  is  a  function  of  each  separate  customer’s  eco- 
nomic  scale.”  In  general,  said  the  Court,  “the  smaller 
the  customer,  the  smaller  is  his  banking  market  geo- 
graphically.”  In  the  Court’s  view,  both  small  bor- 
rowers  and  depositors  were  largely  limited  to  their 
localities  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  financial  needs. 
Large  customers,  on  the  other  hand,  often/have  con- 
venient  access  to  banking  services  outside  the  local 
area. 
Since  the  economic  scale  of  consumers  of  bank 
services  varies,  the  Court  settled  on  a  “workable 
compromise”  to  “delineate  the  area  in  which  bank 
customers  that  are  neither  very  large  nor  very  small 
find  it  practical  to  do  their  banking  business.”  The 
Court  acknowledged  that  this  compromise  could  only 
approximate  the  geographic  scope  of  the  relevant 
market,  and  that  “an  element  of fuzziness  would  seem 
inherent  in  any  attempt  to  delineate  the  relevant  geo- 
graphical  market.”  The  use  of  a  single  “fuzzy” 
approximation  of  the  geographic  market  flows  di- 
rectly  from  the  choice  of  a  single  product  line  in 
banking-the  cluster  of  bank  products  and  services. 
Clearly,  a  disaggregated  product  line  (e.g.,  demand 
deposits,  consumer  installment  loans,  commercial 
loans,  etc.)  might  dictate  the  use  of  multiple  geo- 
graphic  markets  for  analytical  purposes,  depending 
on  the  respective  geographic  areas  over  which  the 
customers  might  practicably  turn  for  alternative 
supplies. 
To  date,  the  Court  has  agreed  with  the  federal 
banking  agencies  that  the  local  area  in  which  the 
banks  had  their  offices  was  an  area  of  effective 
competition.  The  competitive  effects  of  proposed 
mergers,  therefore,  have  generally  been  judged  within 
localized  geographic  markets. 
Analytical  Method:  Concentration  Ratios  Sec- 
tion  7  of  the  Clayton  Act  requires  the  banking  agen- 
cies  to  determine  whether  the  effect  of  a  proposed 
merger  may  be  to  substantially  lessen  competition. 
In  the  Philadelphia  National  Bank  case,  the  Court 
pointed  out  that  a prediction  of anticompetitive  effects 
“is  sound  only  if  it  is  based  upon  a  firm  understand- 
ing  of  the  structure  of  the  relevant  market;  yet  the 
relevant  economic  data  are  both  complex  and  elu- 
sive.”  The  Court  felt  that  it  was  necessary  to 
simplify  the  competitive  analysis  in  order  to  provide 
a guideline  for  sound  business  planning  and  to  insure 
that  Congressional  intent  was  not  subverted. 
In  simplifying  the  test  of  illegality,  the  Court  relied 
on  a  sense  of  intense  Congressional  concern  with  a 
trend  toward  concentration  in  the  U.  S.  economy. 
This  concern,  said  the  Court,  “warrants  dispensing, 
in  certain  cases,  with  elaborate  proof  of  market  struc- 
ture,  market  behavior,  or  probable  anticompetitive 
effects.”  The  Court  thought  that  “a  merger  which 
produces  a  firm  controlling  an  undue  percentage 
share  of  the  relevant  market,  and  results  in  a  signifi- 
cant  increase  in  the  concentration  of  firms  in  that 
market,  is  so  inherently  likely  to  lessen  competition 
substantially  that  it  must  be  enjoined  in  the  absence 
of  evidence  clearly  showing  that  the  merger  is  not 
likely  to  have  such  anticompetitive  effects.”  The 
Court  endorsed  the  use  of concentration  ratios,  there- 
fore,  as  an  indicator  of  proposed  mergers.3 
The  Court  accepts  bank  deposit  concentration 
ratios  as  prima  facie  evidence  in  antitrust  cases.  The 
burden  of  proof  is  shifted  to  the  banks  to  show  that 
the  ratios  do  not  accurately  depict  the  economic 
characteristics  of  the  market.  The  Court  requires 
banks  to  introduce  “significant  evidence  of  the  ab- 
sence  of  parallel  behavior  in  the  pricing  or  providing 
of commercial  bank  services”  in  the  market.  This  is  a 
3 The  use  of  concentration  ratios  is  not  based  solely  on 
grounds  of  simplification,  but  also  has  some  empirical 
support.  Concentration  measures  have  been  positively 
related  with  performance  variables  such  as  prices  and 
profits  for  a  wide  range  of  industries,  including  banking. 
For  a  summary  of  this  evidence,  see  Stephen  Rhoades, 
“Structure  and  Performance  Studies  in  Banking:  A 
Summary  and  Evaluation,”  Staff  Economic  Studies,  No. 
92,  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
1977.  The  Structure-Performance  relationship  has  been 
questioned,  however,  by  suggestions  that  concentration, 
instead  of  leading  to  collusive  behavior.  actually  emerges 
from  competitive  behavior  and  reflects’  the  superior  per- 
formance  of  large  firms.  For  example,  see-Yale  Brozen, 
“The  Concentration-Collusion  Doctrine,”  Antitrust  Law 
Journal  (1977-78). 
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data  is  “complex  and  elusive.”4 
Competitive  analysis  has  focused  on  shares  of  bank 
deposits  (as  a proxy  for  bank  products  and  services) 
controlled  by  individual  banks.  Concentration  ratios 
are  calculated  in  cases  involving  banks  determined  to 
be  presently  competing  within  the  same  geographic 
market,  as  well  as  for  cases  involving  banks  operating 
in  separate  banking  markets  but  viewed  as  potential 
or  probable  future  competitors.  In  existing  compe- 
tition  cases,  mergers  are  generally  prohibited  if  the 
combined  market  shares  significantly  increase  con- 
centration  in  the  market.  In  the  latter  application,  a 
consolidation  is  generally  not  allowed  if  it  either  (a) 
eliminates  a  procompetitive  influence  exerted  by  an 
outside  bank  on  a  concentrated  market  or  (b)  re- 
moves  a  likely  entrant  to  a  concentrated  market  that 
can  reasonably  be  expected  to  contribute  to  the  future 
deconcentration  of  the  market. 
Effects  on  Bank  Markets  The  line  of  commerce 
view  and  the  resultant  analytical  methodology  have 
provided  close  approximations  of  actual  competitive 
conditions  in  many  banking  markets.  The  policy  has 
undoubtedly  preserved  competition  among  banking 
institutions  in  numerous  markets  by  limiting  banks’ 
ability  to  buy  out  competitors.  This  has  contributed 
to  preventing  increased  banking  concentration  and 
possible  adverse  competitive  consequences.  In  some 
markets,  however,  the  predicted  anticompetitive 
effects  of  a  merger  proposal  may  be  overstated,  re- 
sulting  in  denials  of  cases  that  could  have  been  ap- 
proved  without  significant  anticompetitive  results. 
U.  S.  antitrust  standards  declare  a  consolidation  is 
legal  unless  it  tends  to  create  a  monopoly  or  sub- 
stantially  reduces  competition.  The  concern  is  to 
prevent  one  firm  or  a  small  group  of  firms  from 
gaining  sufficient  market  power  to  charge  monopoly 
prices  and  realize  monopoly  profits.  In  cases  where 
the  Court’s  view  misrepresents  the  actual  competitive 
situation  in  the  market,  however,  prohibiting  a  bank 
consolidation  may  represent  an  unwarranted  inter- 
ference  with  the  free  flow  of  commerce.  Competition 
can  be  stifled  by  not  allowing  bank  ownership  to 
pass  from  inefficient,  unaggressive  hands  to  more 
efficient,  innovative  control.  The  number  of potential 
4 Demonstrating  an  absence  of  parallel  behavior  is  diffi- 
cult  for  products  and  services  subjected  to  extensive 
regulatory  price  restrictions  (e.g.,  prohibition  of  interest 
on  demand  deposits,  deposit  rate  ceilings,  and  usury 
laws).  Administered  rates  have  regularly  fallen  below 
market  rates,  forcing  institutions  to  uniformly  pay  (or 
charge)  the  maximum  allowable  rates.  Price  competition 
among  depository  institutions  will  be  much  greater  fol- 
lowing  recent  legislative  changes. 
bidders  for  bank  stock  is  reduced  by  limiting  pur- 
chase  by  existing  or  potential  market  participants, 
reducing  potential  demand  for  bank  stock,  and  lower- 
ing  its  market  value. 
Empirical  studies  indicate  that  banking  is  subject 
to  economies  of  scale,  at  least  for  small-  and  medium- 
size  banks.  As  output  (measured  by  the  number  of 
accounts  serviced)  increases,  average  banking  costs 
generally  increase  less  than  proportionally.  Banks 
growing  through  consolidation,  therefore,  can  often 
economize  on  resources  used  to  provide  banking 
services.  Bank  customers  can  expect  to  benefit  from 
lower  unit  costs  either  through  lower  prices  and/or 
service  charges  for  bank  products  or  through  access 
to  expanded  output.  If  competitive  pressures  do  not 
force  banks  to  pass  on  savings  to  customers,  bank 
profits  may  increase.  Bank  capital  should  benefit 
through  increased  retained  earnings--enhancing  bank 
asset  growth. 
The  evidence  on  scale  economies  in  banking  has 
led  George  Benston  to  conclude  that  “unless  a merger 
reduces  meaningful  competition,  it  should  not  be 
prevented.  Otherwise,  operating  and  other  ineffi- 
ciencies  may  be  continued,  desirable  change  stifled, 
and  owners  of  resources  prevented  from  using  their 
property  as  they  wish.”5  The  vast  majority  of  bank 
merger  proposals,  it  should  be  noted,  fall  well  within 
the  range  where  economies  might  be  anticipated. 
Since  real  private  and  social  costs  can  result  from 
prohibiting  these  consolidations,  the  analysis  used  in 
evaluating  the  competitive  impact  on  the  relevant 
product  market  should  be  sound. 
Inherent  Weaknesses  The  central  core  of  the 
Supreme  Court’s  line  of  commerce  determination  is 
its  finding  that  the  entire  aggregate  of  bank  products 
and  services  represents  an  economically  significant 
market.  “[I]t  is  the  cluster  of  products  and  services 
that  full-service  banks  offer  that  as  a  matter  of  trade 
reality  makes  commercial  banking  a  distinct  line  of 
commerce.”6  This  finding  and  the  resulting  method- 
ology  employed  by  the  Court  and  banking  agencies 
have  been  criticized  since  its  inception.  We  believe 
this  criticism  reflects  some  basic  flaws  in  the  Court 
argument. 
In  a  landmark  case  involving  the  definition  of  a 
relevant  product  market,  the  Court  declared  that  “the 
5 George  Benston,  “The  Optimal  Banking  Structure: 
Theory  and  Evidence,”  Journal  of  Bank  Research  (Win- 
ter  1973),  pp,  220-37. 
6 United  States  v.  Philadelphia  National  Bank. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1981 commodities  reasonably  interchangeable  by consum- 
ers  for  the  same  purposes  make  up  that  part  of  the 
trade  or  commerce.  .  . .”7  Based  on  this  standard,  it 
appears  the  Court  has  aggregated  bank  products  and 
services  beyond  the  point  where  commodities  are 
reasonably  interchangeables  by  consumers. 
The  various  products  and  services  that  banks  offer 
appear  to  be  customer-specific,  i.e.,  they  are  directed 
toward  specific  customer  groups.  There  are  at  least 
two  distinct  categories  of  customers  that  use  bank 
services-individuals  and  commercial  enterprises. 
Banks  can  be  viewed  as  providing  a  cluster  of  con- 
sumer  products  and  services  to  individuals  (demand 
and  savings  deposits,  consumer  and  mortgage  credit, 
trust  services.  etc.)  and  a  separate  cluster  to  busi- 
nesses  (cash  management  services,  commercial  and 
industrial  loans,  etc.).  Though  individual  customers 
may  well  benefit  from  the  provision  of  either  of  these 
clusters  by  a  single  institution,  there  is  very  little 
reason  to  expect  that  individuals  or  businesses  utilize 
both  clusters.  There  seems  to  be  little  or  no  cross- 
over  across  cluster  categories  by  customers.  The  fi- 
nancial  needs  of  each  group  are  distinct  and  serve  to 
restrict  their  respective  demands  to  different  clusters 
of bank  products  and  services.  Planning  and  market- 
ing  activities  reflect  this  with  separate  consumer  and 
corporate  departments  within  banks  and  separate  ad- 
vertising  programs.  Indeed,  many  banks  have  chosen 
to  specialize  almost  exclusively  in  either  the  retail  or 
wholesale  sides  of  the  business. 
Contrary  to  the  Court’s  assertion,  the  entire  bank 
product  line,  therefore,  does  not  appear  to  have  eco- 
nomic  significance-it  does  not  appear  to  be  a  rele- 
vant  market-for  it  is  not  marketed  to  any  one  class 
of  customers.  It  is  only  across  the  cluster  of  con- 
sumer  products  and  services  that  the  pricing  or 
service  level  decisions  of  the  commercial  bank  can 
have  an  impact  on  its  consumer  clientele. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Court’s  definition  of  the  line 
of  commerce  in  commercial  banking  excludes  prod- 
ucts  and  services  of  other  institutions  that  are  “inter- 
changeable”  with  or  close  substitutes  for  individual 
7 United  States  v.  DuPont  &  Co.,  351  U.S.  377,  395 
(1956).  The  emphasis  in  this  determination.  it  should  be 
noted;  is  on  the  demand  characteristics  of  the  consumers 
of  the  product. 
8  The  Court  declared  that  interchangeability  can  be 
shown  by  demonstrating  either  (a)  products  perform  the 
same  function  or  (b)  the  responsiveness  of  the  sales  of 
one  product  to  changes  in  the  price  of  the  other  (high 
price  cross-elasticity  of  demand).  If  “a  high  cross- 
elasticity  of  demand.  exists  between  them;  .  .  .  the 
products  compete  in  the  same  market.” 
bank  services.  Empirical  evidence  reveals  that  a  high 
cross-elasticity  of  demand  exists  between  bank  time 
deposits  and  savings  deposits  at  thrifts.  Moreover, 
disintermediation  from  both  bank  and  thrift  deposits, 
when  market  interest  rates  increase  relative  to  de- 
posit  rates,  indicates  that  other  market  instruments 
are  at  least  partial  substitutes  for  these  services. 
Close  substitutes  for  various  bank  credit  services  are 
similarly  offered  by  nonbank  institutions.  Banks 
cannot  make  pricing  decisions  without  regard  to  the 
availability  of  substitute  products  from  both  bank  and 
nonbank  institutions.  Yet  the  accepted  analytical 
methodology  implies  they  can. 
Use  of  concentration  ratios,  including  only  bank 
deposits,  ignores  the  competitive  influences  exerted 
by  thrifts  and  other  institutions  that  supply  substitute 
services.  Since  the  Court’s  analysis  is  not  affected  by 
the  presence  of  competition  for  individual  bank  ser- 
vices  from  nonbank  firms,  the  significance  of  com- 
puted  concentration  percentages  has  been  seriously 
questioned.  The  Court  “blithely  assumes  that  per- 
centages  of  the  same  magnitude  represent  the  same 
degree  of  market  power,  irrespective  of  the  amount 
of  competition  from  neighboring  markets.”  It  thus 
ignores  “the  extent  to  which  competition  from  sav- 
ings  and  loan  associations,  mutual  savings  banks,  and 
other  financial  institutions  that  are  not  commercial 
banks  affects  the  market  power  of  banks.”9 
If  concentration  ratios  misrepresent  the  market 
power  of  banks,  and  the  existence  of  nonbank  insti- 
tutions  in  the  market  also  affects  banks’  ability  to 
influence  prices,  the  predictive  usefulness,  of  concen- 
tration  ratios  that  exclude  those  institutions  is  di- 
minished.  In  particular,  judgments  based  solely  on 
bank  deposit  concentration,  ignoring  competitive  re- 
alities  in  the  market,  may  overestimate  adverse  com- 
petitive  effects,  leading  to  unwarranted  denials  of 
bank  consolidation  proposals. 
The  Court  and  banking  agencies  appear  at  least 
aware  of  the  danger  of  sole  reliance  on  concentration 
ratios.  In  a  1974  decision,  10 the  Court  acknowledged 
that  concentration  ratios  “can  be  unreliable  indicators 
of  actual  market  behavior.”  In  addition,  the  Comp- 
troller  of  the  Currency  and  Federal  Reserve  Board 
have  given  limited  consideration  in  recent  years  to 
the  competitive  presence  of  thrifts  in  assessing  anti- 
competitive  consequences  of  proposed  mergers.  Con- 
centration  ratios  are  sometimes  “shaded”  to  reflect 
9  Justice  Harlan,  joined  in  part  by  Chief  Justice  Burger, 
in  a  dissenting  opinion  to  the  Phillipsburg  decision. 
10  United  States  v.  Marine  Bancorporation,  418  U.S.  602 
(1974). 
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tion  data  suggest  the  case  might  be  borderline.11 
Erosion  by  Innovations  and  New  Competition 
However  justified  and  effective  established  interpre- 
tations  have  been  in  preserving  and  promoting  com- 
petition  for  banking  services,  competitive  forces  in 
these  markets  have  not  stood  still.  Today,  banks  face 
intensive  competition  across  a  rapidly  broadening 
scope  of  product  and  geographic  markets  from  other 
banks,  thrifts,  and  other  financial  and  nonfinancial 
firms.  This  evolving  competition  represents  an  at- 
tempt  by  the  market  system  to  meet  the  financial 
requirements  of  the  U.  S.  economy.  Price,  product, 
and  geographic  restrictions  have  limited  the  ability 
of  banks  to  fulfill  these  needs  and  have  induced  un- 
regulated  sectors  of  the  economy  to  fill  the  void. 
The  new  competition  banks  face  has  seriously 
undermined  the  relevance  of  some  of  the  Court  de- 
terminations  in  bank  competition  cases.  Today, 
banks  no  longer  enjoy  a  monopoly  in  the  provision 
of  transaction  accounts  to  consumers.  At  the  same 
time,  banks  are  experiencing  an  all-out  invasion  of 
their  other  product  as  well  as  geographic  markets 
from  both  traditional  and  new  competitors.  In  addi- 
tion,  cost  advantages  banks  may  have  once  enjoyed 
over  competitors  have  largely  been  eliminated  as 
banks  increasingly  rely  on  market  sources  of  funds 
purchased  at  market  interest  rates.  The  thesis  that 
banks  enjoy  a  “settled  consumer  preference”  over 
competing  institutions  is  hardly  supported  by  the 
evidence.  Finally,  strong  economic  forces  are.  in- 
ducing  banks  and  other  institutions  to  “unbundle” 
service  packages  and  separately  market  and  price 
financial  services. 
The  Supreme  Court  deemed  some  bank  services  as 
so  unique  that  they  are  entirely  free  of  competition 
from  other  financial  institutions.  Demand  deposits, 
commercial  loans,  trust  services,  and  credit  card 
plans  were  cited  at  various  times  to  distinguish  banks 
from  nonbank  institutions.  Developments  in  recent 
years,  however,  suggest  that  the  strength  of  this 
argument  has  been  greatly  diminished. 
Checking  accounts  were  first  subjected  to  thrift 
competition  when  S&Ls  were  authorized  to  allow 
telephone  transfers  from  savings  accounts  to  third 
parties  in  the  1960s.  In  1970,  S&Ls  were  permitted 
11 A  Board  order involving  First  Bancorp  of  New  Hamp- 
shire  (November  2,  1978),  for  example,  noted  that  “thrift 
institutions  held  a  significant  amount  of  deposits  which 
lessened  the  severity  of  the  effects  of  the  proposed  trans- 
action  on  competition  in  the  market.”  More  recently!  the 
Board  approved  a  large  New  Jersey  bank  merger,  citing 
significant  thrift  competition  as  a  factor  (Fidelity  Union 
Bancorporation,  June  5,  1980). 
to  make  preauthorized  nonnegotiable  transfers  from 
savings  accounts  to  third  parties  for  household  re- 
lated  expenditures.  This  authority  was  expanded  to 
cover  any  expenditure  in  1975.  In  a  major  develop- 
ment  in  1972,  state  chartered  mutual  savings  banks 
began  offering  Negotiable  Order  of  Withdrawal 
(NOW)  accounts  in  Massachusetts  and  New  Hamp- 
shire.  In  1974,  Congress  authorized  all  depository 
institutions  in  the  two  states  to  offer  such  accounts,  a 
privilege  extended  to  the  remaining  New  England 
states  in  1976,  New  York  in  1978,  and  New  Jersey 
in  1979.  Pennsylvania  savings  banks  also  offered 
an  instrument  perceived  by  the  public  to  be  the 
functional  equivalent  of  checks,  the  NINOW  or 
noninterest-bearing  NOW  account.  The  direct 
competition  between  banks  and  thrifts  for  these 
transaction  accounts  has  been  fierce. 
In  response  to  the  apparent  success  of  the  NOW 
experiment,  in  late  1978  federal  regulators  autho- 
rized  automatic  transfers  from  savings  to  checking 
accounts  nationwide  for  banks.  The  Consumer 
Checking  Account  Equity  Act  of  1980  extends  NOW 
account  authority  nationwide  to  all  federally  insured 
banks,  savings  banks,  and  S&Ls. 
Another  development  of  large  dimension  was  the 
credit  union  share  draft,  first  authorized  on  an  ex- 
perimental  basis  in  1974  and  made  permanent  in 
1978.  Share  drafts  and  consumer  lending  powers  at 
credit  unions  present  major  new  competition  for 
banks,  since  there  are  over  22,000  credit  unions  in 
the  country  with  total  membership  including  nearly 
25  percent  of  all  American  households. 
The  new  banking  legislation  also  expands  the 
ability  of  S&Ls  to  compete  effectively  with  banks  for 
consumer  business.  S&Ls  are  newly  enabled  to  di- 
versify  their  portfolios  to  hold  up  to  20  percent  of 
total  assets  in  consumer  loans,  commercial  paper,  and 
corporate  debt  securities.  They  are  further  autho- 
rized  to  engage  in  credit  card  operations  and  to  exer- 
cise  trust  powers  similar  to  national  banks.  These 
services  eliminate  several  key  distinctions  between 
banks  and  S&Ls,  at  least  with  respect  to  services 
offered  to  consumers. 
In  addition,  S&Ls  do  make  commercial  and  busi- 
ness  loans  secured  by  real  estate  and,  since  the  1960s, 
have  offered  savings  accounts  to  state  and  local  gov- 
ernments  and  businesses.  Savings  banks  generally 
have  wider  authority  to  provide  business  services. 
In  several  states  these  institutions  can  make  commer- 
cial  and  business  loans.  Though  these  institutions 
have  not  presented  major  competition  to  bank  com- 
mercial  services  to  date,  the  recent  legislation  au- 
thorizing  federally  chartered  savings  banks  to  hold 
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industrial  loans  and  to  accept  business  demand  de- 
posits  should  give  significant  impetus  to  increased 
competition. 
In  some  key  aspects  thrifts  might  even  enjoy  some 
competitive  advantages  over  banks.  Federally  char- 
tered  S&Ls  enjoy  statewide  branching  privileges  in 
limited-branching  and  unit-banking  states.  In  addi- 
tion,  through  Remote  Service  Units,  S&Ls  allow 
customers  to  make  deposits  to  and  withdrawals  from 
accounts  at  stores  and  other  places  away  from  the 
institution’s  offices.  The  competitive  position  of 
thrifts  relative  to  banks  is  further  enhanced  by  the 
1980  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  Act  pro- 
vision.  continuing  the  ¼  percent  differential  interest 
rate  ceiling  structure  for  six  years. 
A  second  development  undermining  the  Supreme 
Court  arguments  supporting  the  line  of  commerce 
view  has  been  the  sharp  rise  in  the  cost  of  bank 
funds.  The  dominance  of  noninterest-bearing  de- 
mand  deposits  in  bank  liability  structures  has  been 
steadily  eroded  by  inflation,  high  interest  rates,  and 
the  resulting  efforts  of  consumers  and  business  to 
economize  on  holdings  of  idle,  nonearning  cash  bal- 
ances.  In  1960,  demand  deposits  held  by  individuals, 
partnerships,  and  corporations  accounted  for  63  per- 
cent  of  total  bank  liabilities.  This  figure  fell  to  40 
percent  by  1970  and  stood  at  only  31  percent  in 
1978.12  Much  of the  growth  in  bank  time  and  savings 
deposits  has  taken  place  in  negotiable  certificates  of 
deposit  and  other  time  deposits,  particularly  those 
categories  exempted  from  interest  rate  ceilings. 
Banks’  commercial  customers  have  further  attempted 
to  minimize  cash  balances  through  use  of  repurchase 
agreements  that  allow  firms  to  earn  market  interest 
on  excess  transactions  balances. 
Increased  reliance  on  the  Federal  funds  market 
and  other  categories  such  as  Eurodollar  borrowings 
have  also  expanded  the  portion  of  bank  funds  ac- 
quired  under  market  conditions.  The  result  has  been 
a  sharp  increase  in  banks’  marginal  cost  of  funds. 
Since  the  marginal  cost  of funds  is  the  prime  determi- 
nant  of  bank  prices,  competitive  cost  advantages 
banks  once  may  have  enjoyed  over  nonbank  com- 
petitors  such  as  finance  companies  have  largely 
evaporated.  In  addition,  it  is  not  true  today  that 
finance  companies  rely  on  bank  loans  as  a  major 
source  of  funds.  These  companies  derive  most  of 
their  funds  from  the  corporate  debt  and  commercial 
12 Marvin  Goodfriend,  James  Parthemos,  and  Bruce 
Summers,  “Recent  Financial  Innovations:  Causes,  Con- 
sequences  for  the  Payments  System,  and  Implications  for 
Monetary  Control,”  Economic  Review,  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  Richmond  (March/April  1980). 
paper  markets,  with  bank  loans  accounting  for  only  a 
small  portion. 
Relative  growth  rates  of  savings  deposits  in  recent 
years  also  calls  into  question  the  Court  argument  that 
banks  enjoy  a  “settled  consumer  preference”  in  the 
competition  for  consumers’  savings  due  to  the  con- 
venience  of  maintaining  savings  and  checking  ac- 
counts  at  one  institution.  Recognizing  that  competi- 
tion  for  the  savings  dollar  among  banks  and  thrift 
institutions  had  increased,  a  1968  District  Court 
decision13  concluded  that  a  settled  consumer  prefer- 
ence  no  longer  prevailed.  Competition  among  these 
institutions,  therefore,  was  required  to  be  reflected 
in  the  concentration  ratios  used  to  measure  compe- 
tition. 
The  nationwide  extension  of  transaction  accounts 
to  thrifts  suggests  these  institutions  may  be  the  ulti- 
mate  beneficiaries  of  “consumers’  preference”  in  the 
coming  years.  Though  banks  and  thrifts  can  both 
pay  5¼  percent  interest  on  NOW  accounts,  thrifts 
are  initially  pricing  this  service  more  liberally  than 
banks  (lower  minimum  balance  requirements,  etc.). 
Continuation  of  the  interest  differential  on  savings 
along  with  more  liberal  branching  authority  in  many 
states  may  provide  a  competitive  advantage  for 
thrifts.  In  addition,  credit  union  share  drafts  pay 
higher  interest  than  NOW  or  ATS  accounts.  We 
might  expect  to  see,  therefore,  an  acceleration  of 
growth  of  savings  and  small  time  deposits  at  thrifts 
relative  to  commercial  banks. 
Finally,  economic  conditions,  innovations  in  finan- 
cial  markets,  and  new  technology  are  breaking  down 
traditional  methods  of  marketing  banking  services. 
Banking  customers  are  more  interest-sensitive  than 
ever  before  and  are  demanding  higher’  yields  for 
surplus  funds.  In  response,  the  financial  system  is 
clearly  moving  toward  payment  of  market  rates  for 
all  categories  of  funds.  Institutions  resisting  this 
trend  will  experience  a  reduced,  ability  to  attract 
customers.  Government  policymakers  recognize  that 
restrictions  on  depository  institutions’  ability  to  pay 
market  rates  on  deposits  has  contributed  greatly  to 
the  rapid  growth  of  “near-deposit”  market  instru- 
ments,  most  notably  money  market  fund  shares  that 
reached  the  $80  billion  asset  level  by  mid-1980. 
These  funds  provide  a  highly  liquid,  low  denomina- 
tion  investment  yielding  a  market return  not  subject 
to  Regulation  Q  or  deposit  reserve  requirements. 
To  a  limited  degree,  they  can  even  be  used  as  trans- 
action  accounts. 
In  this  new  environment,  an  increasing  proportion 
13 United  States  v.  Provident  National  Bank,  280  F  Supp. 
1 E.  D.  Pa.  1968. 
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explicit  price  basis.  Customers  receiving  market 
interest  on  deposits  can  expect  to  pay  full-cost  prices 
for  other  services  provided  by  their  depository  in- 
stitutions.  It  may  no  longer  be  feasible  for  firms  to 
offer  a  wide  range  of  specialized  services  to  their 
depositors  free  or  at  subsidized  prices.  Another 
force  contributing  to  this  result  is  recent  legislation 
requiring  the  Federal  Reserve  System  to  charge 
explicit,  per-unit  prices  for  the  payment  system  ser- 
vices  provided  to  depository  institutions.  These 
charges,  by  necessity,  will  also  be  passed  on  to  cus- 
tomers.,. 
The  emergence  of  an  explicit  pricing  environment 
should  contribute  to  the  further  “unbundling”  of 
bank  products  and  services.  Explicit  pricing  may 
also  reduce  customers’  costs  of  obtaining  information 
about  financial  services.  This  may  reduce  the  im- 
portance  of  locational  convenience  in  banking  rela- 
tionships-especially  in  an  electronic  banking  envi- 
ronment. 
Electronic  Funds  Transfer  Systems  are  reducing 
the  importance  of  one-stop  banking.  Proliferation  of 
credit  and  debit  cards,  preauthorized  transfers, 
automated  teller  machines,  point-of-sale  terminals, 
as  well  as  telephone  and  mail  banking,  expand  the 
geographic  scope  of  the  “locally-limited”  customer 
and  increase  the  ability  of  distant  institutions  to  pro- 
vide  effective  competition  in  local  areas.  As  a  result, 
increased  scrutiny  of  geographic  as  well  as  product 
markets  will  be  required  in  bank  consolidation  cases. 
Changes  in  Competitive  Analysis  Some  disaggre- 
gation  of  the  relevant  bank  product  line  seems  neces- 
sary,  therefore,  before  economically  relevant  markets 
can  be  defined  for  antitrust  purposes.  At  the  same 
time,  significant  competition  from  nonbank  firms  that 
affects  banks’  ability  to  set  prices  and  service  levels 
must  be  included  in  the  competitive  analysis.  We  are 
not  suggesting  total  disaggregation  and  examination 
of  concentration  ratios  for  every  individual  service 
line.  Some  aggregation  still  seems  relevant.  For 
instance,  treating  the  consumer  and  commercial  (or 
retail  and  wholesale)  sides  of  banking  as  separate 
lines  of  commerce  would  allow  an  analysis  of  compe- 
tition  in  the  products  and  services  produced  by  insti- 
tutions  separated  according  to  the  types  of  customers 
that  use  them.  This  treatment  would  appear  con- 
sistent  with  the  emphasis  the  Court  placed  on  cus- 
tomer  demand  characteristics  in  its  definition  of  a 
relevant  product  market  in  United  States  v.  DuPont. 
Disaggregation  and  analysis  of  multiple  product 
markets  will  require  careful  evaluation  of  the  rele- 
vant  geographical  markets  over  which  customers  can 
“practicably  turn  for  supplies.”  Clearly,  the  poten- 
tial  of  electronic  banking  and  the  possibilities  of 
relaxing  prohibitions  on  interstate  banking  in  the 
near  future  will  blur  geographic  delineations  and 
require  an  intensified  research  effort  in  this  area. 
It  is  our  belief  that  there  is  no  longer  sufficient 
justification  for  excluding  thrift  institutions  from 
the  competitive  analysis  in  markets  for  consumer 
services.  These  institutions  have  now  attained  the 
status  of  being  fully  competitive  with  banks.  In  fact, 
until  the  interest  differential  on  savings  and  branch- 
ing  differences  are  eliminated,  thrifts  may  even  enjoy 
a  clear  advantage  in  competing  for  consumer  busi- 
ness.  Their  deposits  should  be  included,  therefore, 
in  the  calculation  of  concentration  ratios  for  antitrust 
purposes. 
Considering  the  limitations  placed  on  the  ability  of 
savings  and  loan  associations  and  credit  unions  to 
compete  for  commercial  business,  however,  these  in- 
stitutions  can  probably  continue  to  be  excluded  from 
the  analysis  of  the  market  for  commercial  services. 
This  may  not  be  the  case  for  mutual  savings  banks 
with  their  commercial  lending  and  deposit-taking 
powers.  The  Supreme  Court  apparently  anticipated 
the  inclusion  of  these  institutions  as  competitors  with 
banks  :  “At  some  stage  in  the  development  of  savings 
banks  it  will  be  unrealistic  to  distinguish  them  from 
commercial  banks  for  purposes  of  the  Clayton  Act. 
In  Connecticut,  that point  may  well  be  reached  when 
and  if  savings  banks  become  significant  participants 
in  the  marketing  of  bank  services  to  commercial 
enterprises.”14 
A  disaggregation  of  the  product  line  into  consumer 
and  commercial  categories  would  require  dual  anal- 
yses,  possibly  involving  the  use  of  an  expanded  geo- 
graphic  market  definition  for  business  services.  With 
this  methodology  it  might  be  possible  to  conclude, 
for  instance,  that  a  proposed  acquisition  would 
have  no  significantly  adverse  competitive  conse- 
quences  on  the  market  for  consumer  banking  services 
(based  on  personal  deposit  market  shares)  while  the 
impact  on  the  business  product  line  (based  on  busi- 
ness  deposits  or  commercial  loan  shares)  warrants 
denial  of  the  application. 
The  above  suggestions  are  by  no  means  definitive. 
They  are  viewed  merely  as  the  minimum  changes 
necessary  at  the  present  time  to  reflect  competitive 
reality  in  the  marketplace.  They  may  only  represent 
the  initial  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  Courts  and 
the  regulators  of  the  evolution  underway  in  banking 
competition. 
14 United  States  v.  Connecticut  National  Bank. 
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